Rationale
The downgrade reflects our view that protracted softness in the manganese
market will continue to pressure ConsMin's EBITDA in the fourth quarter of
2012 and in 2013. We therefore expect that the group's leverage will be high,
with a Standard & Poor's ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA at more than 10x at
year-end 2012, compared with 3.5x at the end of 2011. We also factor in the
prevailing uncertainty on the supply-demand balance and price for manganese in
2013, which we think may prevent ConsMin from improving EBITDA and lead to
continued negative free operating cash flow (FOCF). The downgrade also takes
into account our view, under our criteria, of the group's "less than adequate"
liquidity, which we think could weaken further if FOCF turns substantially
negative.
Lower Chinese imports of manganese pulled down ConsMin's sales volumes by 18%
in the first nine months of 2012, with a particularly severe contraction in
the Electrolytic Manganese Metal (EMM) end market. We expect very weak
fourth-quarter results, given the lower benchmark manganese price of $5.2/dmtu
(dry metric ton unit) during the period (versus $5.35/dmtu in the third
quarter), and the group's decision to temporarily halt production in Ghana in
November and December in order to focus on waste stripping amid feeble demand
from the EMM market.
We think that the group will post weak EBITDA of about $32 million for
full-year 2012 (excluding a noncash inventory write-back of about $34
million), assuming that fourth-quarter EBITDA is close to breakeven. Its cash
balances at the end of 2012 will likely decrease to about $80 million from
$133 million reported on Sept. 30, 2012.
In our base-case scenario for 2013 we factor in EBITDA of about $90 million
and debt to EBITDA below 5x for ConsMin. This is based on the following
assumptions:
-- A benchmark manganese price of $5.2/dmtu as we don't expect markedly
stronger demand for manganese ore in 2013 given the weak steel industry
conditions globally.
-- Further reductions of cash costs, which in our view will likely be the
main boost to ConsMin's EBITDA. This year, the group successfully completed
the transition from contractor mining to owner-operated mining in Australia,
thereby lowering its cash costs to $2.93/dmtu in the third quarter of 2012
from $3.63/dmtu in the same period in 2011. ConsMin should be able to achieve
additional cash cost cuts by switching to lower strip ratio pits in Australia
for the next 2-3 years.
We also take into account what we view as considerable downside risks to our
forecast, such as:
-- The lower manganese price, and
-- The group's inability to execute the cash reduction program, although
we note its good track record in 2012, and
-- Potential Australian dollar appreciation.
If 2013 EBITDA is markedly below our base case of $90 million, this would
likely lead to substantially negative FOCF and consequently weaker liquidity.
Liquidity
We assess ConsMin's liquidity as "less than adequate" under our criteria. We
think that ConsMin has limited relationships with commercial banks, as
demonstrated by the absence of sizable and long term committed liquidity
facilities. We also think that the group has limited ability to absorb a
high-impact, low probability event without need for refinancing. We also think
that material negative FOCF could tighten liquidity.
We estimate ConsMin's ratio of liquidity sources to uses at more than 1x for
the 12 months starting Oct. 1, 2012.
Key liquidity sources over this period include:
Surplus cash of about $87 million, after deduction of $30 million that we view
as tied to operations and $16 million of pledged cash.
Funds from operations of about $40 million.
$11 million under equipment-financing facility in Australia.
We project the following uses over the same period:
Capital spending of $60 million. We note that the group has the flexibility to
cut its capex if market conditions deteriorate.
No dividends and no substantial debt maturities in the next two years.
ConsMin has $22 million available under the overdraft facility in Ghana that
matures on Dec. 31, 2013. We exclude it from the liquidity sources because of
its relatively short-term maturity and the need for the group to renew it each
year.
Additional liquidity sources could stem from ConsMin's ability to divest its
minority stakes in two Australian listed mining companies, OM Holdings Ltd.
(not rated) and BC Iron Ltd. (not rated). The market value of these stakes was
$86.2 million on Sept. 30, 2012.
On the positive side, ConsMin no longer has any maintenance financial
covenants since it repaid its Australian working capital facility. The bond
documentation contains incurrence covenants: a fixed charge coverage ratio of
at least 2.5x and senior secured leverage below 2.5x. We expect these levels
were exceeded as of end-September 2012.
Still, we think that the permitted debt basket leaves substantial leeway for
additional funding.
Recovery analysis
The issue rating on ConsMin's $405 million senior secured notes due 2016
(which includes the $34 million spent on buying back outstanding notes held as
Treasury stock as of Sept. 30, 2012) is 'B-', in line with the corporate
credit rating on the company. The recovery rating on the notes is '4',
indicating our expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.
The recovery rating on the notes reflects ConsMin's tangible asset value and
the guarantees and security provided for the notes. At the same time, recovery
prospects are constrained by material, senior claims with a legal or
structural advantage, which are attached to some of the company's valuable
Australian assets. Weaker enforceability prospects in the more uncertain
Ghanaian jurisdiction further constrain recovery prospects.
The notes are guaranteed by subsidiaries representing 86% of consolidated
total assets at end-December 2011 and benefit from the following:
A first-ranking lien over all of the shares in the issuer and the guarantors
that are located outside of Australia.
A first-ranking lien equitable mortgage over all of the shares in the
Australia-based guarantors, and a first-ranking lien over substantially all of
their property and assets (excluding the priority security).
A second-ranking charge over inventory and stockpiles of ore held by the
Australian guarantors, as well as over accounts receivable from the sales of
such ore (the "priority security"). However, at enforcement, the notes will
rank second in right of payment behind the credit facilities in respect of the
proceeds of the Australian security package.
We believe that the most likely center of main interest will be Jersey (U.K.)
or Australia, where the most valuable security is located and where we believe
there are creditor-friendly insolvency regimes. However, we note that the
company generates a substantial part of its earnings in Ghana (B/Stable/B), a
country with a degree of sovereign risk and whose insolvency regime and
jurisdiction we have not analyzed.
Our simulated default scenario contemplates a default in 2014, mainly owing to
volatility in the manganese mining industry, combined with ConsMin's potential
inability to service its debt.
We value the company as a going concern. This is because we believe it would
most likely be reorganized in the event of a hypothetical default, given its
good position in the manganese market. We calculate ConsMin's EBITDA at about
$60 million at the time of simulated default. Assuming a 4.5x multiple of
EBITDA at default--to account for the volatility of valuations in the sector
and the location of assets--we obtain a gross enterprise value of about $270
million.
After deducting priority liabilities, drawings under the $20 million
equipment-financing facility, and permitted debt under the covenants, we
calculate that about $165 million would be available for noteholders. Of
these, we estimate that about 70% would come from Australia, the most reliable
jurisdiction in insolvency situations (in spite of the current
underperformance) and the provider of tangible asset security to the notes,
although there could be upside coming from the asset security provided in
Ghana, as the company has generated and will likely generate a significant
portion of its EBITDA there. In addition, our valuation includes six months of
prepetition interest. We therefore anticipate average (30%-50%) recovery
prospects for the $405 million notes, which equates to a recovery rating of
'4'.
Outlook
The negative outlook reflects the risk of a downgrade in the next 12 months if
we saw a substantial reduction in ConsMin's cash balance and ensuing
deterioration in its liquidity. This could stem from sizable negative FOCF in
2013, which could in turn be triggered by EBITDA below the $90 million we
anticipate in our base case, owing to further manganese price declines, or
delays in the group's cost reduction plan, and the absence of timely capex
adjustments.
We could revise the outlook to stable if ConsMin successfully executed its
program to cut cash costs, and returned to sustainable neutral-to-positive
FOCF based on manganese prices steadily above $5/dmtu.
Related Criteria And Research
-- Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded,
Sept. 18, 2012
-- Methodology And Assumptions: Liquidity Descriptors For Global
Corporate Issuers, Sept. 28, 2011
-- Key Credit Factors: Methodology And Assumptions On Risks In The Mining
Industry, June 23, 2009
-- 2008 Corporate Criteria: Ratios And Adjustments, April 15, 2008
-- 2008 Corporate Criteria: Analytical Methodology, April 15, 2008
Ratings List
Downgraded; Ratings Affirmed
To From
Consolidated Minerals Ltd. (Jersey)
Corporate Credit Rating B-/Negative/-- B/Negative/--
Senior Secured B- B
Recovery Rating 4 4
Source: http://news.yahoo.com/text-p-cuts-consolidated-minerals-b-outlook-negative-114820951--finance.html
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While most of us were enjoying the holidays with our families all over the world, someone who is related to the CEO of Facebook posted a photo of her family to friends, and then some journalist person downloaded it and tweeted it. There?s a real difference between something being private and something being personal. And that, as the aforementioned incident highlights, is a notion that a lot of people — including Randi Zuckerberg — have forgotten, online and off. What I mean by this is that just because you post something online, doesn?t mean it?s meant for public consumption. Yes, this all sounds very conflated, and yes, Facebook privacy controls are about as easy to understand as left-handed scissors for a right-handed person. However, somewhere in this slow news big news cycle, publications started to tell the story that said Facebook CEO’s sister clearly didn’t understand Facebook’s privacy controls. This is simply not true, because the photo wasn’t private, it was personal.?Allow me to explain the difference. Private As A Peacock Private: confined to or intended only for the persons immediately concerned; confidential: a private meeting If something is “private” in your mind, it’s probably not a good idea to share it on the Internet…anywhere. I don’t care what types of controls a social network gives you. There’s no such thing as full-on “privacy” on the Internet. Do you know what is private? A good-old-fashioned photo in a scrapbook, passed around one by one at the dinner table during the holidays. If you see someone try to pull out their phone to snap a photo for Instagram purposes, you can say “HEY! That’s private.” This can’t be done on the Internet. Once something is out there, it can be screen-shotted, captured and re-shared just as easily as it was uploaded in the first place. As we learned with Snapchat and Poke, those sexy private photos and videos aren’t really “private” either. I’m not even going to get into the difference between public and private, because I feel like that’s fairly obvious. Privacy is a lost art in humanity these days. We’re so used to sharing every darn thing that happens to us, myself included, that we have lost a sense of self, therefore leaving ourselves open to the shit show that ensued during the boringest news week of the century. No matter what Randi Zuckerberg said after the fact, people
